Linking my perspective for consideration.
https://hackmd.io/@rocknet/BkbhHe6TT
TLDR;
I hope that you take the time to read what took me a lot of time in reading, consideration, and writing this document. If you can’t, here’s the TLDR;
Scale with:
- Implement LEB4 alone (distinct RPIP needed)
- Implement megapools (RPIP-43)
- Implement forced exits (RPIP-44)
- Keep RPL bond / do not implement ETH-only minipools (abandon RPIP-42 / RPIP-48)
- Do not reduce the borrowed ETH commission to Rocket Pool Node Operators by 75% (abandon RPIP-46)
current Node Operator commission: 14%
RPIP Values:
node_operator_share = 2.5
voter_share = 1.0
2.5 + 1 = 3.5
3.5 / 14 = 0.25 (25%, a 75% reduction)
Note: Some reduction in commission for LEB4 may make sense, just like we did for LEB8, that should go to rETH, again, like we did with Atlas. (distinct RPIP needed) - Do not implement a mechanism to buy and burn RPL (abandon RPIP-45)
- Support NodeSet as a method of scaling Rocket Pool
- Generally supportive of a dynamic / variable commission concept without the buy/burn concept
Indifferent on removing opt-in upgrades RPIP-47 - Consider reducing the ETH bond below 4, after a demonstrated period of LEB4s and NodeSet being deployed while the deposit pool remains full, and Rocket Pool is not approaching self-limit, while retaining some level of RPL bond