A few reasons I’m against. I can’t rationalize this into being net-positive given the points below. Also, the sentiment in the previous thread leans opposed AFAICT. Is there a reason to think that the tweak suggested here (dynamic max vs. period-reduced max) would be more favorable?
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This adds unnecessary (IMO) complexity to an already complex collateral system. We should err on the side of simplicity wherever we can.
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Since any change involves change management risk and dev time opportunity cost, the benefits need to be significantly work it — we should continue to keep a high bar for changes we introduce. I simply don’t see a strong enough benefit here (or really any benefit). Basically I’m echoing this sentiment.
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It limits the efficacy of UEBs, if we decide to introduce that in the future. There are ways that the protocol can make productive use of this “excess” RPL. I’d rather see us take the perspective of “Let’s find ways to make better use of excess RPL” instead of “Excess RPL is useless so we should lower limits and give some back”.
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In general I’m hesitant to bundle other tokenomics changes with LEBs since that could potentially multiply risk. I don’t think we fully know what a post-LEB world will look like.
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Being honest, this limits RPLs value capture, which will have secondary impacts on things like pDAO budgets.
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From a growth and marketing perspective, reducing the cap will directly limit maximum NO yield, which makes RP potentially less appealing for new node operators.
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20% seems somewhat arbitrarily chosen. What’s the reason for this specific magic number? Why not 30%? 15%? Can we justify this with security or research?