Max Collateral for LEBs

After a short discussion in trading I’ve learned the following:

  • RPIP-8 and RPIP-12 (neither of which has gone to a snapshot vote by the community) both describe that the maximum collateral that a NO can stake will be based on the amount of borrowed ETH, referred to as matchedETH in the draft contracts.

So this means that a NO with a single LEB8 minipool would be able to stake 24ETH*150% = 36 ETH_worth_of_RPL.

The proposal (purpose of this post) was to alter the drafted design so that the maximum percent (e.g., 150%) will be calculated on the amount of NO deposited ETH, not the matchedETH. In the example case of a single NO that has LEB8 would only be able to stake 8ETH*150% = 12 ETH_worth_of_RPL.

I have found it helpful just to focus on this aspect, should the maximum RPL collateral be based on NO staked ETH or matchedETH and ignore the clause in the opening proposal regarding 20% as that does not have and effect for LEB8s or LEB4s.

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Hi All - I think RPIP-8 is ready to get finalized.
There have been no new proposals for the vote in about 24 hours, so I think we have our slate of 3 options (+nuke LEBs, +abstain).

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There is a lot of information spread in a number of places with varying language which can end up being a little confusing so I would just like to post my final thoughts in as clear a manner as I can manage.

Why I am For the proposal to Scale with NO ETH

It maintains the current tokenomics for Node Operators.
Max effective RPL remains exactly the same for someone moving from 1x16 ETH minipool to 2xLEB8s.
No one gains or loses any RPL rewards or voting power and the RPL lockup does not change.

It does not reduce Protocol Security.
The minimum collateral amount which is the amount of RPL collateral deemed necessary for safety scales with ETH borrowed from the protcol and is the exact same value for all the proposed options.

It will result in the maximum amount of additional rETH capacity.
RPL rewards will be higher for anyone with less than 24 ETH worth of RPL on their nodes compared to the other options. This will encourage node operator growth rather than reward people hoarding large amounts of RPL on a small number of minipools.

It is the best option for rETH holders.
Maximising additional rETH capacity will allow more people to hold and use rETH, this increases network effect, liquidity and overall usefulness of rETH in DEFI.

It is the best option for RPL Holders.
The value of RPL is directly linked to the minimum required collateral & the number of minipools.

Growing and onboarding new node operators and increasing the number of minipools launched is the only path to fundamental long-term increased value of the RPL token,

Anything else such as rewarding increased amounts of superfluous staked RPL above the current maximum or adding friction via lockups that will not matter after withdrawals are enabled are simply short-sighted pumpanomics.

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@Valdorff not trying to stir the pot here at all, but I brought this up back in May when we were debating min collateral levels, and your position seems to have been different. Can you share what changed your mind?

https://dao2.rocketpool.net/t/variable-minipool-size-w-rpl-stake-based-on-protocol-eth/685/9?u=lilac

On min, my mind is unchanged. On max, I spent time thinking about it, and that’s where the top post comes from.

The max is much less important than the min, and during initial discussion I didn’t want to endanger the fragile agreement by debating this less important parameter. It went on the summary as a thing that should get figured out, but it never was (I certainly lost track of the loose end).

hey so atm it seems that rETH supply growth is a bit clogged b/c theres not enough node operators / minipools online to accept deposits and mint new rETH. And network growth does seem like our north star atm…which I think makes sense :smiley:

So wouldn’t the choice that grows rETH supply the most be scale with PO rETH? Cause this would reward the operators supporting the most ETH deposits coming from non-operators.

fixed amount feels pretty simple / straight forward to me - not as much as a boost for operators supporting network growth, but still generally solid.

and scale with NO eth seems like it doesn’t rly reward the rETH expansion we need atm.

am I looking at this wrong way? apologies for any dense questions here…

There’s no wrong way to look at it. There are reasonable arguments on both sides. However, in LEB 8, a NO with one minipool staking RPL worth 2.4 ETH, 12 ETH, 24 ETH, or 36 ETH still still support the same amount of rETH (ie, combined 24 ETH deposit).
rETH growth potential just comes down to which option you think will cause more minipools to start or continue operating; again both sides think their argument is superior from this standpoint. Good luck with your vote!

I’m voting for NO ETH because I hold quite a lot of RPL but have little ETH except for a few minipools. My logic for supporting NO ETH as the base for RPL max collateralisation is that I have to convert RPL to ETH to get the stake for an LEB8. Having done so I want to be able to provide as little RPL as possible (12 ETH worth) to get maximum rewards. This frees up more RPL to fund another LEB8. Bottom line is that I can fund more high collateral minipool creation using my RPL this way than if the flat collateralisation option is mandated. I think that many holders of the 70% of RPL unstaked fit into my category. If so we can collectively fund at least double the current number of minipools and if the existing ones are converted to LEB8’s that will give Rocketpool four times the number of staked ETH. Successful implementation of LEB8’s should then lead to a further doubling of ETH capacity with the introduction of LEB4’s.

min collateral is based on protocol eth. I believe max collateral should still be based on protocol eth. it is so confusing that the max collateral somehow switches to NO eth.

i prefer voting for 150% protocol eth but it seems like 24 eth is a better use of my little votes.

Not financial advice. All 3 options are fine, will not hinder long-term investment thesis. Albeit difficult, let’s assume RPL staked greater than min to a certain extent would provide additional value to RPL. Chalk it up to NOs servicing 3x the amount of rEth with 8LEB and in return we create a runway for their future rEth consumption. Artificial demand and RPL TVL increases from Existing NO’s pressured to increase their RPL staked alongside rEth consumption to achieve similar RPL APY as status quo – scaling. Real question - what is the ideal max that would not cannibalize rEth consumption or restrict NO demand. Assume all 16 minipools will convert to LEB8.

Currently, we consume ~147k rEth with ~9.2k minipools. With LEB8, immediate increase to 442k rEth. We will need 294k rEth to meet current NO demand, or 3x current which took us 1 year of extraordinary increases from a long-awaited launch. Based on current collateral % per NO, additional ~1k eth of rpl purchased to meet minimums of 8LEB. Our ratio, all else held constant, ~13% increase - not much.

At this point, existing NOs will be waiting to receive a piece of 294k rEth from DP not yet available. If we infer from our first year, it will take 3 years to clear existing NO demand, not including any new NOs. Current NOs may reach for 150% collateral while waiting but at 12 they are receiving the same yield as before. No immediate pressure - Lost opportunity for demand.

New NOs - Splash onto the scene like Mike Tyson hungry for dem ears. DP empty. Assume first year minipool growth, new NOs bring additional 18.4k LEB8 minipools requiring 294k rEth to meet their demand, or 3 years. Let’s cut new NO demand in half, assuming disappointment from RPL rewards at 24 max. Minimum 1.5 years to clear first year new NO demand. Time to satisfy existing NO + new NO appetite = 4.5 years to clear NO demand. You can extrapolate conservatively from here.

New NOs also bring 44.1k eth of RPL to meet minimum. Around 1 year mark (likely longer since they won’t be able to create minipools from lack of rEth), total of 45.1k eth might be purchased. Our ratio, all else held constant, significantly higher.

This is a short-term picture. I believe RPL will have 3 business cycles in chronologic order (with short bursts where the pendulum swings); rEth shortage, NO shortage (unless LEB4 launch extending rEth shortage), and inevitably, NO shortage.

LEB8 stats - Assume all minipools maintain current 40% avg RPL staked; Est. ~22m RPL tokens after 3yrs inflated:

Avg 40% applied to 24eth = 9.6eth of rpl avg

  • Max possible minipools = 45k
  • Max rEth consumption 1.1m - Highly unlikely we 7.5x rEth within 2 years.
  • Max total tvl = 1.9m eth

Avg 40% applied to 12eth = 4.8eth of rpl avg

  • Max possible minipools = 91k
  • Max rEth consumption = 2.1m eth
  • Max total tvl = 3.3m eth

2.4 avg:

  • Max possible minipools = 181k
  • Max rEth consumption = 4.3M rEth
  • Max total eth TVL = 6.4m eth

There is an inverse relationship to our TVL based on average RPL staked. While its clear 2.4 max seems to be the clear winner, I would infer its better suited for when our rEth consumption reaches near our max capacities. It would make 2.4 max better suited for our 3rd business cycle – NO Shortage. If RPL is successful, it is likely we would have to lower min to achieve greater rEth consumption/TVL. RPL token inevitably becomes increasingly scarce/expensive. Ancillary assumption w/ tech held constant - NOs = higher barriers to entry than stakers.

Simply don’t see NO shortages/rEth cannibalized post-LEB8 + ~3 years. In the meantime, a well calibrated min/max could maximize our efficiency and value. Regardless, RPL has a bright future. All 3 options do not harm RPL long term, but each can avoid creating time gaps where demand/TVL lags due to constraints. If you agree we will be rEth limited, supplementing RPL TVL via 24 or 36 max while our new NOs await their rEth seems to be ideal. We can adjust once NOs become a clear limit to our growth. Thanks for reading. @waqwaqattack @Valdorff @ken @Wander

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Yes, we only attracted 147k rETH in our first year. We also ran no incentives for almost that entire time and people were worried about execution risk because of the Merge. There were only two weeks in the post-merge, post-rETH incentives world where we were able to take on unlimited dp demand before we ran out of NOs. Between 9/16 and 9/30 we minted 15k rETH. Obviously I don’t think “extrapolate from those two weeks” is any better an idea that extrapolating from the unrealistic conditions we had for much of our first year. But I also don’t think it’s any worse an idea, and if we do that then the good news is that we’ll be able to eat up all that extra demand from LEB8s in 8 months.

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Replying to myself like all the cool kids do. Denum and I ended up chatting about this and I think we both expect to be rETH constrained for some time to come after LEB8s, though maybe we disagree on how long that time will be. Everyone go call your friends who are holding thousands of ETH they want to stake :wink:

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