Thanks everyone for sharing your thoughts! I’ll address a few things, but I want to leave room for others to comment as well.
Could you expand on this? Everything I suggested was buy-burn because it was the only way I could find to main it capital gains. A claimable ETH flow is, to my understanding, ordinary income rather than capital gains.
I’m not an accountant and this is a global protocol, so I can’t speak to specifics here. Personally, I don’t think technical decisions should be made to accommodate tax laws in certain jurisdictions since those can change (another example of change = bad for building stuff, as mentioned above). That said, a simple wrapper token contract can be made which accrues value at the rate of rewards, like rETH. You deposit your RPL, you get rRPL, and the rRPL increases in value (i.e. capital gains).
Does adding a capped financial incentive to stake RPL alongside running minipools potentially solve this problem?
It helps, but doesn’t solve it. Generally speaking, less rewards to uninvolved speculators = less incentive to exploit.
The protocol can still generate revenue by minting RPL.
This is true, but as we mention in the report, doing this will significantly reduce the advantage in terminal tokenomics vs the existing situation. If you account for pDAO/oDAO funding, it could be nearly identical.
If your business requires enshrined subsidies from the protocol, it shouldn’t exist (sorry).
To be clear, NodeSet as a business is in no danger, even if tokenomics were changed tomorrow completely disable Constellation somehow 
We have dozens of other opportunities for us to invest development resources, with more appearing all the time. RP is at the top of the list right now because we came from this community, and we wrote this report because we think Constellation’s positive effects on RP may be hindered.
@samus The centralization concern isn’t for governance, it’s for key-man risk and consequently rETH safety. If Coinbase has 90% of validators, then rETH is essentially cbETH with some extra complexity (risk). Because RP is permissionless, there’s no way to prevent this outcome unless the portion of ETH-only minipools is limited (Lido is going with 10% for these reasons).
This has historical precedent: at one point, DAI became basically USDC with extra steps, and MakerDAO has floundered ever since. It would be a shame to see this happen to RP.
If someone put in infinite ETH to be an NO gobbling up all possible rETH, we could reduce NO share, including to 0%.
Governance can be slow, and damage continues during debate. And wouldn’t setting this value to 0% effectively disable the incentive for all ETH-only minipools? Wouldn’t it just be better to set up sensible TVL limits in advance so that this scenario doesn’t occur in the first place?