Agree on all counts, with the possible exception of term limits (I see the benefit but am concerned that would introduce campaigning and governance overhead).
Perhaps not “near-term”, but I’d also like to suggest we expand the scope of oDAO changes to also include economic adjustments, specifically:
- We need to find another way to fund the dev team that doesn’t rely on oDAO inflation allocation, as @thomasg mentioned here. It’s not long-term sustainable for the team to rely on oDAO funds for operating expenses as we expect the oDAO to be expanded or eventually removed.
pDAO Budget Definition - #19 by thomasg - Currently the oDAO has an incentive to keep the number of oDAO members small, to increase the size of their allocation. It would be great to align our design for a decentralized oDAO with their financial incentives. Arguably with the current design they carry a conflict of interest. An example would be switching from a percentage to a fixed payout.
- Since the oDAO members are paid in RPL but have expenses denominated in ETH (gas), their profitability depends on the RPL/ETH ratio and gas prices. At a low RPL/ETH ratio or high gas fees, it may not be profitable to run an oDAO node which introduces a risk to the protocol. OTOH, at a high RPL/ETH ratio we’re likely overpaying for their services and not being capital efficient with our treasury funds. One could argue that we’re currently overpaying oDAO for their services today.
#1 and #2 definitely depend on smart contract changes. #3 could be managed manually if we’re willing to dynamically adjust the oDAO inflation percentage to whatever is reasonable given a criteria at current RPL/ETH ratio and gas prices.