I am opposed to the pDAO taking control ownership of a guardian multisig at this time.
Open to option 3 of the poll.
- The guardian account should be a multisig with signers set in a way that would improve the bus factor / should have been for some time now
- pDAO guardian multisig (PGM) benefits in providing a foothold of community involvement (aligned interests) at a high protocol security level while also providing the benefits of multisig
- The cost incurred would be new coordination costs and exposing the guardian account’s perverse incentives to committee selection process and on going potential of collusion or takeover
- PGM would be a de facto highest power governing body
Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
The ability to define the distribution of inflation funds and expend such funds is problematic. This control may be fine for small operations in which benefits and costs are tightly aligned. In this proposed setup there are concentrated benefits (PGM) and dispersed costs (all other direct and indirect Rocket Pool participants ) to malicious actions. A compromised or colluding group has ability, in a short time frame, to misuse power in a way that will set them pretty for life while destroying the protocol. The PGM actors may have incentives to behave in a good manner in one time period but in a collusive manner in another as circumstances change. The disperse costs provide smaller incentives for any individual actor to monitor much less attempt to enforce good behavior by the PGM.
The team does have this ability to misbehave but so far have been checked by themselves, their reputations and by being doxed. They also have a track record of behavior where they could have taken ICO funds and left or misused the guardian account.
Misuse of the guardian account potential payout increases as the protocol, its value, and RPL all increases regardless of which actors have control.
New Central Authority
PGM can override community decisions and exert control as the highest executive authority. If the community voted against liquidity incentives a well meaning PGM could override, for the health of the protocol, by distributing funds to themselves to provide liquidity incentives, overriding any calls for PGM member removal and/or holding the protocol hostage.
While this supreme central committee maintains benevolence all will be well. The while statement must be maintained. I see PGM with pDAO dominance as not a simple multisig setup but rather at its core a highest level governing body proposal.
- Adjust the current proposal to something softer (poll option 3) and qualify as temporary
- Map out controls of guardian account, identify conflicts and where controls are needed
- Develop governance and contract changes out of needed controls
- Develop lower level soft governing bodies such as a grants and bounties
- Learn from these groups and harden them over time
- This is neither fast or easy and delays will erode community commitment and involvement
pDAO multisig control is my ideal future state once the guardian account incentives are broken out and mitigated by governance controls. The current proposal has tremendous value in putting a stronger light on the guardian account issue and in providing a solution. However, it puts the cart before the horse with pDAO control and I find myself currently in opposition to the proposal.
With this viewpoint I’m generally against formalizing a charter at this time. Option 3 from the poll with a temporary signifier and proposed charter is a reasonable compromise.