Reduce Maximum RPL Collateralization rate to 75% over time

Just my two cents, but it seems to me like this could potentially be broken into two separate questions that don’t need to share the same solution. Heads up that I’m coming at this from the perspective of someone who wants to operate Supernodes in the future

  1. What is the right collateralization ratio range to incentivize, and should there be a more complex/nuanced approach to issuing RPL rewards?

  2. How much do we choose to arbitrarily restrict liquidity when it comes to RPL unlocks?

As an example, we could choose to allow RPL unlocks above 50% collateralization while retaining the existing reward structure that extends to 150% collateralization.

This would potentially help alleviate destabilizing liquidity crunches and subsequent mass unlocks/selloffs while simultaneously rewarding dedicated RPL holders. I strongly believe that liquidity crunch-induced volatility will negatively impact the general perception of protocol stability.

More importantly, it dramatically simplifies liquidity management for Supernode operators, who may in the long run be responsible for considerable ETH/RPL TVL. @knoshua 's solution for bucketizing Supernodes (An Alternative SaaS Design) exists because of the arbitrary friction imposed by the current RPL locking mechanism (as well as concerns about contract upgradeability).

Would lowering the RPL unlock threshold negatively impact RPL’s long-term value? Perhaps, but extending the RPL rewards window beyond the unlock threshold may mitigate negative price pressure in the near term (everyone who is heavily overcollateralized is a major RPL bull anyways). Down the line, implementing UEBs would solidify RPL as an asset worth holding in of itself, as it gives the holder the right to generate ETH cashflows.

RPL holders who’ve seen considerable price appreciation would be incentivized from a tax perspective to continue holding their RPL and utilizing it to run additional minipools instead of swapping over to ETH.

In summary, reduce RPL unlock threshold to improve UX and Supernode operator efficiency (it’s a bad look if the system’s design inherently drives validator churn), implement UEBs if they are sound from a security perspective (further enshrining RPL’s value in the system), and come to a reasonable agreement on RPL incentive range and any other unique reward dynamics (e.g. diminishing returns as you increase your collateralization level).

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