as the author of said topic, I have some idea about the original intent.
I’m not sure you realize the scope of the can of worms that this opened. While I’m sure you’d love to make the case for including those below 10% in future votes, we can’t actually vote on that without clarifying who should be allowed to vote now. In order to clarify that, we have to resolve the question of RPIP-4. So, before we get back to your original intent, we need to stay on task.
Since we’re unlikely to agree anywhere close to unanimously about what RPIP-4 prescribes, I think we should go ahead and sentiment poll to see if there is desire to hold the 2-way vote.
To reiterate, we will hold a linked vote with the same options, but two different strategies- one including those below 10% and one excluding them. If both votes agree, then the result of those votes will be enshrined as the explicit formula by which voting power should be calculated in the future.
We should hold the two linked votes to establish what strategy the pDAO will adopt.
We’re not yet ready.
0voters
If there is agreement that we should move forward via this path then we can get back to the original topic of this thread.
Providing some feedback as someone who is < 10% at the moment.
We split 16 > 8 a bit too aggressively and sit at about 6% (purchased more RPL at 0.026 to be above the 10% marker and RPL is currently ~0.014).
It is our intent to acquire more RPL to retake part in the staking rewards - which for our NO size will be a high 5 digit figure. I don’t think we should have a vote until this is accomplished. To do otherwise would also reduce RPL value prop.
My issue with this proposal is: what do we do if the two votes disagree? To me it is inviting chaos in one of three possible outcomes. I actually think we just have one vote: for those above 10% (ie like last snapshot). If those <10% don’t like the outcome, they can leave, they can buy RPL, or they can wait until they are above 10% and hold a new vote.
I personally will buy RPL to stay above 10% and vote to enfranchise those below 10%.
Response to patches to save space
So I voted that I think RPIP 4 likely allows <10%, but I have low certitude. I have higher certitude that those who believe in pDAO decentralization will vote to allow votes by all NOs. Practically, there’s almost no possibility that NOs under 10% will vote to disenfranchise themselves while those about will vote to enfranchise them-so it strikes me that vote that has no real benefit.
Also, I think there are conceivable middle grounds: NOs under 10% vote at 75% or 50% effectiveness.
Response to datanexus
That’s no fair, you quoted only half of my sentence So it is certainly possible that both votes agree that we keep > 10%. I think there are many who agree with you. But it seems hard to believe a scenario where overcollateralized NOs think undercollateralized NOs should vote, but undercollateralized NOs think they themselves should not vote with enough vote power majority to overcome the >10% cohort (who are at least 80% of that vote).
Return to discussions until we can satisfy both strategies. I think this is pretty unlikely, at any rate.
If those <10% don’t like the outcome, they can leave, they can buy RPL, or they can wait until they are above 10% and hold a new vote.
From the perspective of someone who believes RPIP-4 includes those below 10%, you are suggesting disenfranchising a large number of voters, which is, in my opinion, an unacceptable outcome and will forever taint the legitimacy of the pDAO.
I personally will buy RPL to stay above 10% and vote to enfranchise those below 10%.
I likely will as well (except for the part about buying RPL). While not relevant to the above poll, I support the notion of anyone with at least 1 active minipool having a vote.
Practically, there’s almost no possibility that NOs under 10% will vote to disenfranchise themselves while those about will vote to enfranchise them-so it strikes me that vote that has no real benefit.
If the linked outcomes are that those under 10% should be excluded, it will be important to demonstrate that the those in favor can overcome those opposed in both strategies.
A tough one. We could opt for runoff choice (eg, the one that wins by a bigger margin, or the one with more “For”) to avoid a possible unclear outcome.
Our take on why as a NO under 10% that we would opt that our vote should not count:
By allowing <10% votes, there is less of a reason to get back in alignment with the protocol. If anything there should be more reasons to maintain the 10% minimum rather than less. Ultimately this leads to a healthier position for RPL (and better price stability).
For the 0-150% half of the dual vote, do we have explicit guidance on how to define the 150% limit for LEB8s? The options in my mind are:
Keep 150% of 16 ETH per minipool (as it was defined at that time)
150% of 24 ETH per minipool (if interpretation of 150% refers to borrowed eth)
150% of 8 ETH per minipool (if interpretation of 150% refers to node eth)
Since, from what I can gather, the argument for 0-150% is that when RPIP-4 was written, the effective stake method used 0-150% and therefor should be cemented as the current range. But at that time, there was no defined answer if that 150% referred to NO or borrowed ETH since they were the same. Is that accurate or is there explicit guidance on which version to interpret?
My initial reaction is that it would be 16 ETH per minipool, as unintuitive as that seems, if that is consistent with the function at that time. In which case, if we end up adapting such an interpretation of 0-150% then we would also adopt the decided upon 150% limit as it is part of the same criteria.
Some supporting info for now:
Archive of explainer article that notes limits of 150% RPL stake with a possible reference to NO ETH (by ordering of the statement) but not explicit.
As an aside, my personal opinion on this matter is that the definition of effective RPL is understood as it is used in other parts of the protocol to mean 10%-150%, as others have mentioned. RPIP-4 defines it as the value returned by that function, which leaves it subject to change in the future. I actually don’t have an issue with that as it allows the voting weight to adapt to changes in “effective RPL” in the future, such as has happened with LEB8s and will happen with LEB4s+ and proposed staking changes.
As far as if <10% NOs should be allowed to vote, I do think requires a separate vote and RPIP. The dual vote feels a bit out of thin air, but probably does offer the best opportunity to arrive at a clean sentiment (if both votes match).
I doubt it’s contentious to say that the 150% side for both votes is tied to bonded eth, as that has always been the behavior of the snapshot strategy since the advent of leb8s and nobody has challenged it.
To complicate things if it was not said already. Should a NO’s voting weight be consistent with their RPL stake for earning RPL rewards? Meaning should the change that is being contemplated for focusing the RPL incentive at t~10% bonding level also apply to the voting power that NO has?
We do not need to discuss this until we pass the tokenomics vote (assuming it passes- it may not), so let’s stay on task with unwinding the current predicament.
That draft RPIP explicitly says it won’t impact voting.
Except for not including “withdrawing” RPL, there SHALL NOT be any changes to voting power based on this RPIP
The version being worked on for finalizing also says it won’t impact voting:
Voting power calculations SHALL NOT be changed based on this RPIP (though do note that they SHALL NOT count “Unstaking” RPL)
Either way – explicitly shouldn’t matter, and patches is right about cart/horse. We need to bootstrap first. Then we can change whatever we want with well-defined voting.
@Patches and @Valdorff Thank you for your replies; I agree with your points. Let me see if I understand the proposed resolution after re-reading the thread. In order to answer the premise of this thread “Are bonded-RPL NOs with a bonding level below 10% (i.e., they have bonded RPL but not effectively bonded RPL) eligible to vote?” we propose to ask the question to the pDAO via a vote. BUT how can we vote for the answer if we don’t know who is eligible to vote? To solve the dilemma we propose to present two identical votes simultaneously to the pDAO as described below.
In the first vote, the eligibility snapshot is all NOs who have RPL bonded between 0-150% and their voting power follows the 2xquadric formula in use. In the second vote the snapshot is taken with eligibility at 10-150% e.g. effective RPL) based on the day and time the snapshot is taken. Again the same 2xquadric formula is applied to calculate a NOs voting power.
If the two votes reach the same result, the result stands. If the two votes disagree on the outcome, we will return to the forum for further discord on the topic before revoting.
I think voting power from staked RPL should align with staked RPL that earns rewards as closely as possible to a) reduce complexity and b) act as an additional incentive to maintain the RPL bond value
The quadratic voting system would give outsized weight to multiple Nodes with the smallest staked RPL amount. Requiring >10% RPL prevents this sort of Sybil attack by requiring significant monetary investment/alignment.
Allowing those with <10% RPL combined with quadratic voting in my opinion unfairly gives Nodes too much voting power for their holdings.
I agree that arbitrary snapshots make it hard to maintain >10% RPL. I would propose snapshotting all pDAO votes aligned with the last rewards snapshot so a NO only has to worry about their RPL bond once a month.
Maybe even only have a monthly cadence for pDAO votes aligned with the rewards snapshot. Would potentially slow down voting decisions but could increase turnout.
I don’t think we need to discuss further if 10-150% says “include 0-10%” and 0-150% says “do not include 0-10%”. In this case, 0-10% have stated that they themselves do not want to vote, so we can just honor their “wish” because even if we include them they wouldn’t want to vote.
So, it boils down to the following:
Let 0-150% be 0.
Let 10-150% be 10.
Let 0 and 10 signify a “include 0-10%” vote.
Let !0 and !10 signify a vote to exclude 0-10%.
So it is certainly possible that both votes agree that we keep > 10%. I think there are many who agree with you. But it seems hard to believe a scenario where overcollateralized NOs think undercollateralized NOs should vote, but undercollateralized NOs think they themselves should not vote with enough vote power majority to overcome the >10% cohort (who are at least 80% of that vote).