Here’s how this affects Constellation:
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We expect (but have not yet tested) that 0 RPL minipools will work with Constellation’s design.
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We did not design Constellation for these economics and there may be some disconnect between user expectations if this proposal passes. For example, xRPL holders may reasonably claim that they have the right to ETH flows based on the RPL they are providing, but Constellation does not support this.
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Constellation’s temporary node operator bond will need to be increased from 1 ETH to 3.4 ETH because this proposal changes the scrub penalty from RPL to ETH. This will likely decrease the number of operators who can participate in Constellation.
Non-technical, non-NodeSet personal stuff:
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Although I appreciate the benefits of this proposal, I personally see this as a net negative for RP because it represents a step backwards for the security model. I.e. it makes a majority of node operators’ ETH revenue dependent upon centralized entities (the oDAO) which use the same unaudited code, and it provides no alternative for these users.
I wish these kinds of experiments were done in a different protocol rather than changing RP, and I suspect that decisions like this are why RP is slowly losing community members and NOs. Even if the majority vote in favor, there will be those that leave because of this decision.
Perhaps this decision will reverse that trend. Perhaps that will be temporary. Perhaps TVL growth is explosive and this dissent looks foolish. Perhaps this doesn’t change anything while adding existential risk, causing everything to fall apart. Perhaps this is much ado about nothing because there are no effects. Time will tell
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It really sucks for builders to invest so much work (in our case, years) only to have the economic model changed drastically. I share @ramana’s opinion that RP needs to do a better job of working with rather than against builders. This is not the path to long term success.