Thank you for kicking off this discussion. I also started to look at this last week and broke it down based on the governance status:
Saturn 1 Leftovers
So RPIP-49 has this section that calls for work and votes to happen before Saturn 1. That didn’t happen… I think a Saturn 2 RPIP should either address those outstanding points or state that we decided to delay/remove them entirely.
Saturn 2 Surplus Share Strategy
We wanted to figure out Burn vs. Buy & LP vs. nothing. I agree that this appears less pressing now and we should defer here.
Penalty System
We wanted to research and ratify a mev penalty system. With how mev has been going the last few years, this also appears less pressing now. But I worry that we keep pushing this off indefinitely and that mev could become a problem at some point.
This also relates to the voted on RPIP-44, see below.
Node Operator Commission
Increasing the deposit pool maximum effectively removed the control the security council has over node_operator_commission_share. RPIP-72 also added a pdao_share to UARS. With limited rETH demand, lowering overall commission may become a conversation. Overall it seems that figuring out when and how to adjust UARS deserves more attention.
Already voted on (RPIP-49)
Lowering Bond after Second Validator to 1.5 ETH (RPIP-42)
I think we should revisit this. For the protocol, we prefer people to move from minipools to 4 ETH megapool validators over people on megapools going from 4 ETH to 1.5 ETH. We may not have the rETH demand to support the former by Saturn 2, I don’t think this was clear at the time we voted on this.
Remove RPL Rewards for Node Operators (RPIP-46)
This seems ok.
EL triggered exits
RPIP-44 is mostly about voluntary exits from the node operator or exits in case of MEV theft. Without the work on the penalty system above, scope could be reduced here.
Ideas without Vote
In addition to using EL triggered exits for bad performers and withdrawal liquidity that langers mentions, I want to also look at:
Faster withdrawal credential exploit check
Saturn 1 removed the oDAO scrub check duty and replaced it with a beacon state proof. With the current proof, this means that the second 31 ETH deposit for a validator can only happen once the first 1 ETH deposit made it through the beacon queue. Depending on how the beacon queue develops going forward, we may want to look at speeding this process up, which may be possible with a tweaked proof.
pDAO Settings Guardrails
The Saturn 1 audits introduced a number of new guardrails on pDAO settings that now clash with what is specified in the RPIPs. I think it would be good to collect the actual values used in one place together with an explanation of why they are necessary. This could just be an informational RPIP that extends the parameter table in RPIP-33. If there are any values that seem unnecessary or problematic, cleaning that up would require a vote.
How can community get involved?
I am interested in contributing to the design and RPIP process here. I know that @haloooloolo also expressed interest in contributing on at least the forced exit stuff. How can we coordinate with the team on this? What does the team want to do internally and what do you want to leave to the community? How can we make sure that we don’t duplicate efforts, especially with regards to those internal workshops you mention?