At maturity, the LST governance token competes with the LST itself. This does not seem like a desirable outcome or sensible product strategy.
Why not? BTW, are you aware UARS have knobs to make token less competitive if necessary?
Under our proposal the reason for owning RPL at maturity would be continuing RPL yield.
Too fast. Current tokenomics looks good under maturity, but it’s not clear if reaching maturity is possible with that tokenomics. We have a death spiral unfolding the last year, and I have no reason to believe that separation of RPL and ETH parties in the system may have any impact on this dynamics. It is too risky to own RPL before maturity, so we can see what I described earlier – in case of bear market RPL holders would prefer to sell and the only party that have a strong incentive to buy in your proposal is pDAO. You can limit pDAO, but you end up in a state where no one wants to buy and supply any more RPL and pDAO has already staked all its RPL => no more validators and the protocol is stagnant (tending more to reduction rather than growth due to inflation).
I’m copying from a response I made to Jasper previously, please lmk if you have more questions.
Okay, I see. I think that ultimately, the likelihood of CA depends on 1) the yield and 2) the will. If you try to reduce the yield for whales, then we may never reach maturity. So you have to live with big actors, and I guess there’s a possible way to limit CA growth if necessary. As for the will, I doubt we can stop evil actor, simply bc, we can’t tell who is good and who pretends to be good.
Would you kindly answer the question “what are the proposed collateral amounts for LEB4 and lesser LEBs”? I think this is important missing piece because these numbers might allow us to predict some system dynamics. Shell we expect a shortcut to a maturity or another death spiral like we got with the advent of LEB8?