Pre-RPIP discussion of how RocketPool may use EIP-7002, exits initiated by the withdrawal address.
The withdrawal address in RocketPool’s case is a smart contract, so first: What are the mechanics of a smart contract initiating a withdrawal? Can it actually? I thought only EOAs could sign anything.
Provided there is a path, how should RocketPool use it?
Dissolve inactive minipools. With thresholds - start pinging on Discord at N weeks of inactivity (2?), put NO on notice at N2 weeks of inactivity (4?), forcibly dissolve minipool at N2 weeks of inactivity (12?)
MEV theft. Currently RocketPool has a 3 strikes rule for penalties. Regardless of what happens to penalties, create a 3 strikes rule for force-dissolution. 1 instance of theft, warn NO. 2nd instance, warn again with note that next instance will force-dissolve. 3rd instance, forcibly dissolve the minipool. The protocol protects itself - an NO who remains unaware across 3 proposals should likely step up their game; and we need a way to remove minipools in case of malicious, not accidental, theft.
Do not dissolve minipools for reasons of deposit pool liquidity. Let arbitrage incentivize NOs to dissolve minipools and thus make liquidity available for people who want out of rETH. Also the incentives committee have levers to pull. We don’t need to force-exit, unlike other LSTs with permissioned NOs.