Justification for moving oDAO inflation to the IMC

Governance
21

I’m against 100% going to IMC as that would mean none of the (ex) oDAO inflation would be directed to dev funding. I’d like to see the team answer to this before going ahead with this vote, but meanwhile I voted for 50% and 75%.

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22

I was thinking with the assumption that this amount would be AFTER the amount for the team is deducted

1 Like
23

I voted 50% because:

The GMC would have received ~$72,000 this month (if the payments were fixed).

This month, the GMC received funding requests totaling $263,525 as part of the new monthly award cycle. It’s important to note that while this month’s request is substantial, we cannot predict that the GMC will consistently request such high amounts every month.

The GMC reserves are $1,200,000.

Under the hypothetical scenario that the GMC funded all applicants at the current pace, the GMC would be depleted in six months.

I don’t think the argument that the GMC is not spending their money is a strong one - they had a retrospective award cap in place that was just removed, and now that applications are open at all times, application requests should go up.

2 Likes
24

I’m struggling a little to make this concrete for a vote.

I think vaca/waq concerns about the team spend being not-yet-defined are valid. I think ShfRyn’s uncertainty about GMC will be a lot better understood after 2-3 cycles vs the current 1 cycle. There’s also an argument to be made for voting on the component parts (fix split to intent going forward, fix historical splits, add to IMC split maybe with amount as part of vote), but obviously there’s a cost there in complexity.

I’m currently leaning to a single vote with:

  • Correct split for future; add an extra 16% to IMC’s split
    • This is 50% per the “diverted initial oDAO funds” metric Jasper was using; it’s aimed to be significant but conservative.
  • Expense to make up for past periods being lower than intended
Splits, for context
  • Current: Incentives (e.g., LP bonuses) - 27%, Grants and Bounties - 16%, Reserve Treasury - 57%
  • “Intended”: Incentives (e.g., LP bonuses) - 34%, Grants and Bounties - 20.5%, Reserve Treasury - 45.5%
  • Proposed: Incentives (e.g., LP bonuses) - 50%, Grants and Bounties - 20.5%, Reserve Treasury - 29.5%

I made a draft RPIP (and expense) for this - see the diff here.

I’ll give time here for a bit of commentary before putting up a sentiment poll. Note that we won’t go to snapshot until after RPIP-4 stuff is resolved.

2 Likes
25

So I would vote for this for sure. But here are my thoughts on process:

  1. Based on the poll above, the most common choice was 100% of funds to IMC; the next was 75% of funds. Choosing 50% may be the correct choice, but doesn’t seem to capture the best guess of pDAO wishes.
  2. I don’t love bundling these votes in this way; they are thematically linked, but are not interreliant. While less complex, it makes determining the pDAOs actual desires somewhat challenging. ie, 2 of the 3 major changes are largely correcting errors and are unlikely to meet any resistance. The third is a specific new allocation of a large chunk of funds in perpetuity; so people who vote ‘no’ because they either want more or less IMC diversion will also vote to keep errors in our governance.
Because there is no consensus in the forum, I would recommend an 'approval' vote somewhat along the lines of:
  1. No, keep RPIP-10 as written
  2. Yes, split previous oDAO funds 25% IMC/75% Reserve AND fix the errors
  3. Yes, split previous oDAO funds 50% IMC/50% Reserve AND fix the errors
  4. Yes, split previous oDAO funds 75% IMC/25% Reserve AND fix the errors
  5. Yes, split previous oDAO funds 100% IMC/0% Reserve AND fix the errors
1 Like