Hi folks!
I talked with Liquity a bit, partly with my IMC hat on, and more with just a community member hat on.
I wanted to see how the DAO feels about providing incentives for their product
Liquity Intro (including v2)
- Liquity V1
- They’re one of my go-to answer for what good defi looks like
- Fully ossified contracts (aka immutable)
- Minimal offchain stuff (they do depend on an oracle rate, which they get from chainlink)
- Governance free
- Deposit ETH “troves” to borrow LUSD against it
- Kept on peg by liquidations (fall below allowed TVL; collateral is liquidated at a discount to repay debt) and redemptions (anyone can swap LUSD against the trove with least-healthy TVL)
- Works great at preventing negative depegs, but have seen significant upward depegs
- Has a stability pool where LUSD can be deposited to automatically help with repegging - incentivized by both the discounts on liquidations and LQTY incentives)
- One-time fee up front
- Liquity V2
- Will allow LST collaterals (eg, wstETH and rETH)
- Each of these will have separate stability pools and borrow rate markets.
- Will be ossified
- May have a tiny bit of governance for liquidity incentives
- Tweaks from V1
- New stable called BOLD (remember, stuff is ossified, so can’t use LUSD)
- Interest rate is ongoing and set by borrower (updatable whenever). Interest rate control can also be delegated to a 3rd party (eg. DeFi Saver, Summer Fi)
- Redemptions are from the lowest interest rate trove per market
- Ie, you’d redeem BOLD against a basket or ETH/wstETH/rETH
- Recovery Mode from Liquity v1 has been removed - which means borrowers can borrow at the advertised LTV ratio without worrying about an overall protocol ratio.
- Smaller liquidation penalty of 5% compared to 10% from v1.
- Will allow LST collaterals (eg, wstETH and rETH)
So why do we want rETH involved?
- Useful to be able to borrow against it, ofc
- The dynamic interest rate things allows for the market to have a strong voice (vs, eg, Maker where the interest rates are set by governance)
- We try to steer clear of “degen leverage”; while this does allow it, the inclusion of the stability pool helps mitigate damage from this kind of use.
- We have very little liquidity against USDlike on-chain (and a ton off-chain); would it help to add some on-chain?
- Good brand relationship for both of us
Paths
Liquity are asking for help bootstrapping the first year, and then hope to be self sustaining. I will purposely give a broad set here, without presenting my own opinion. For context, IMC’s current spend is ~$350k/period (periods are 28 days). It was somewhat higher when the RPL ratio was higher because we’ve been trying to run lean to preserve runway. It fluctuates somewhat with ETH price, as we track most expenses in ETH (and a couple in RPL).
What are some paths we could take?
- IMC could provide on the order of 8E=$24k/period incentives to rETH/BOLD
- Context: this would be about a tenth of our total rETH/ETH mainnet spend
- Context: this would be a bit over half our L2 rETH/ETH spend
- Context: this would be half our spend on PancakeSwap’s mainnet rETH/ETH concentrated liquidity
- Context: this would be 3.5x our spend on RPL/ETH
- Can the IMC do this: This is a lot. I’d want an explicit voted pDAO direction for this.
- IMC could provide on the order of 2.5E=$7.5k/period incentives to rETH/BOLD
- Context: this would be similar to the spend on RPL/ETH
- Context: this would be about half the spend of rETH/ETH on one L2
- Can the IMC do this: The IMC charter doesn’t cover USDlike at all, though it does talk about “access to rETH across major DeFi protocols” and “build rETH exchange volume”. This is an amount I’d feel comfortable moving on with either strong support in forums and other casual channels or a vote.
- We could provide funds for stability pool incentives
- The rough expectation is that incentives here improve the peg and thus ten to reduce interest rates indirectly
- In a leverage cascade, a healthy stability pool acts as a buffer
- The IMC is generally not a big fan of leverage (and especially incentivizing it) due to the potential for cascades.
- Can the IMC do this: I think this would need a vote, either to have someone else do it, or to tell the IMC to do it despite being a bit outside the usual remit.
- Nothing
- We determine we won’t provide incentives at this time due to some combo of being USDlike, encouraging leverage, etc
There would be some open questions: Do we provide more budget to IMC for this? Does IMC have control at all, eg, to spend less if they judge that appropriate? Should we explore starting aggressive and ramping down instead of uniform? What level do we actually want (the bullets are rough examples, not the only options)?
For now, I’m looking for high level vibes, and we can figure out details if there’s enough interest to make that sensible.