Problems observed from various DAOs
(ie, what I would propose to solve):
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Difficulty with long term planning, executing stepwise timelines, strategic visions. Governance tends to lurch from one ‘most important decision’ to another. (For example, the run-up to atlas upgrades was wild. There was a conflict between ‘we need more time to reach consensus’ and 'we need to get these recommendations out before audit.’ Without the hard work of a few members we would not have hit deadline, but the last minute arguments fragmented the DAO)
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Uncertainty about the shared values/priorities of fellow members and difficulty projecting this to the outside world. (For example, changes to the oDAO structure/reimbursement are extremely high priority to many pDAO members. This ferocity came as a shock to the team and to other pDAO members when it erupted a few weeks back)
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Favoring action over inaction, with the idea that doing anything is better than nothing. Votes often have ~100% approval, suggesting the time for decentralized democracy is actually in the planning rather than voting stage. There is irregular and arbitrary time allowed for community input. (Example, RPIP-17 has 99.5 approval with thousands of votes, but the important bits were decided by a handful of people on discord over a fairly short time frame)
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A very small number of active and well- intentioned, but unelected participants are responsible for major decisions; this is through necessity as most members are inactive until votes occur. (Example, oDAO members have basically voted 100% with rocket pool team proposals, and very few have introduced any proposals of their own).
Proposal: Elect a new MC which is responsible for delineating a strategic vision and setting the tempo for pDAO business.
Name: Something along the lines of Protocol Improvement Committee (PIC) or pDAO Steering Committee (PSC) or Strategic Planning Council (SPC). Unknown.
Duties:
- Enumerate strategic priorities for the pDAO in the coming year
- Set a timeline of achievable pDAO actions for the next 12 months (this includes dev milestones, pertinent votes, etc); meet on a monthly basis to update the timeline.
- Assist the other MCs in meeting their deadlines
- Enlist/cajol community to ensure timeline is being followed and that community input is obtained.
- Recommend edits to drafted RPIPs to clarify language, ensure they are meeting strategic priorities, and attempt to ascertain the will of the DAO.
Membership: All voting committee members (maybe 9) shall be members of pDAO. One non-voting member will be chosen by Rocket Pool team to help communication between the groups. One non-voting member from rETH holders (chosen somehow?).
Specific powers granted: None. This is an advisory body and is intended to supplement, not replace the ability of pDAO members to introduce improvements to the protocol (specifically it is not meant to be one-committee-to-rule-them-all). However, because it is elected it will have significant soft power with guiding RPIPs etc. Committee votes will be public knowledge; some supermajority should be required to change the strategic priorities to encourage compromise and prevent strategic whiplash.
Elections: This body needs to be closer to the will of the people than other committees; candidate statements will list their strategic priorities so that voters can choose. My thinking is like a scheduled quarterly snapshot vote of confidence. If >7.5% of eligible votes are in favor of new elections (ie a majority of a quorum), then new elections will be called the following month.
Anyhow, this is just a starting point to gauge whether there is any interest and to try to gather suggestions. Many of these duties overlap with Jasper’s ideas for a GMC coordinator. My preference is for a committee so that 1) less power is concentrated in a single person’s hands, now that we hit that billion dollar cap and 2) it’s free because there are a lot of talented people already trying to do these things without formal acknowledgement.