pDAO guardian multisig charter

Hmmm… I think you’re actually misreading something. The oDAO is the highest body for almost everything (in the current state, and regardless of where the pDAO guardian is held). They can upgrade the contracts, and even take away all but a tiny sliver of the pDAO guardian’s power. I’m only aware of two things the pDAO guardian can do over the oDAO: prevent oDAO consensus by setting a requirement greater than 100% (this is essentially protocol-destroying), and set the maximum penalty the oDAO can put on a node operator (this power is not oDAO removable).

The oDAO can’t spend funds right now… but they can change the contract to allow themselves to spend funds. They can change the contracts so the pDAO guardian can no longer spend funds. They can change the contracts so the pDAO guardian can’t set oDAO consensus. Etc.

Perverse incentives
The size of the treasury is pretty nice, but not really enough. Even after the recent pump, it’s under $3M. With a 7 of 12, this is a lot of people to corrupt for not that much money. The bigger threat is destroying the protocol to, eg, short something and make money that way. This incentive does exist for the PGM, and it also exists for the oDAO (which can destroy the protocol even more thoroughly, fwiw).

It is my belief that we are safer from perverse incentives with a large PGM than we are with a team-only or oDAO only PGM. If the overlap with the oDAO is sufficient, there is not even a small check on the oDAO. If it’s team-only, we are exposed to a variety of risks that come about from sometimes being physically all in the same place, eg, a wrench attack could be devastating (as could a government subpoena).

PGM as Governance (New Central Authority)
This authority is (A) not a new one and (B) less central than the current form. The pDAO guardian’s powers are not growing or changing in this proposal, they are merely being transferred. The current pDAO guardian is controlled by a single entity, so it’s maximally central - any change will make it less central by definition.

That aside, I don’t believe the PGM has governance powers. They have heavy emergency powers, but the PGM cannot realistically exert strong powers unless it is willing to take down the whole protocol. In your example with liquidity incentives, the oDAO could move to write out the PGM’s ability to spend. Only by preventing the oDAO from taking any actions ever can the PGM prevent that. There is no middle ground, so I don’t think there’s a realistic threat of the PGM doing something like this “for the protocol’s good” (since it would probably kill the protocol).