Question about blockspace derivatives

The business model of blockchain is the sale of blockspace, Ethereum blockspace is limited. There is a gas to determine who and what consumes that supply.

The gas is used to specify the amount a stakeholder is willing to pay for his own tx to be included in the chain. With EIP 1559 in the London Update, the block was divided into bacefee and tips, making the block dynamic. However, since the gasLimit in a block is fixed, the number of tx that can be included in a block due to fluctuations in the bace fee will vary depending on network demand.

History is littered with examples of increased volatility in commodity markets, and derivatives markets have helped reduce risk for producers and consumers, and can serve as a broad-based price discovery tool.

As mentioned in the article “Opportunities and Considerations of Ethereum’s Blockspace Future” here and in other prior cases and articles, the solution of block space futures has been discussed Manifold, Alkimiya, and QI Protocol are actually discussing and developing solutions.

The Ethereum community has also started discussing credible commitments called PEPC, and Slot auction (block space futures) and parallel auctions have been mentioned as examples of their application, which may increase the task of the Proposer. The main users would be sophisticated staking operators like you guys.

My question is whether Proposer really wants to express preferences in block construction by doing block space futures or taking on extra tasks. And what concerns do those who actually answer Yes/No to these questions consider?

I look forward to discussing this with the rocketpool community.

We have been disparagingly called hobbyists before, but there’s real truth to it. If it boils down to something in the clients or an easy setting (like mev relays), then it’s doable. Stuff beyond that is unlikely to have much uptake at a guess.

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