There is currently a discussion ongoing to clarify minimum effective RPL for voting (whether the pDAO wants NOs with RPL collateral less than 10% borrowed ETH to be able to vote). I wanted to raise the question about whether we should examine the other end of the spectrum (aka, maximum effective RPL at 150% of NO bonded ETH) and consider removing that cap at the same time.
I am proposing allowing NOs to vote/delegate with unlimited RPL; this would divorce RPL reward calculations from effective voting power. While this does increase the relative vote strength of overcollateralized NOs, it does so fairly minimally because vote power is still based on square root of staked RPL (see below). A very conscious decision was made in RPIP-4 to include only NOs and not RPL holders; however, IIRC the major reason for this was because 1) there was no good way to use quadratic voting while preventing massive sybil attacks by RPL dust holders, and 2) folks actually running nodes were felt to have the best protocol alignment. I think this proposal actually enhances both those goals. Additionally, after reading Kane’s notes on proposed on-chain voting and understanding at least 20%, I think this could be a way to simplify the process with fairly minimal downside.
- Sybil action vs removing cap: A NO has a 16 ETH minipool and 150% RPL (24ETH worth). If they want to double their vote power in the current system, they can create another identical node for 40 ETH equivalent. By removing the maximum effective RPL cap, they could double their vote power by adding 72 ETH equivalent of collateral to their node (ie ~90% more expensive).
- Megawhale vs common man/woman: A NO has 10,000,000 RPL (more than half the supply) and decides to stake it on one node with a 16ETH minipool, giving a whopping 843,750% of NO bond. They have an effective vote power of 1581. A minimum collateral 8E minipool (2.4 ETH of RPL) has 6.67 power. So 237 minimum collateral NOs (<10% of our NOs) could outvote that non-existent megawhale. It would be much, much more effective for the megawhale to sybil, which is allowed in current state.
- Increases the vote power of overcollateralized NOs (counterpoints are these NOs are still highly Rocket Pool aligned; they can get even more vote power currently by sybiling; and the vote power of overcollateralized NOs is already nerfed by square root voting).
- NOs could stake large amounts of RPL for specific votes, and then withdraw after the 28 day wait (the snapshot is taken at the start of voting period, so I’m not actually sure if there is a risk here, but i’ll add as possible risk for completeness)
- Any changes to something as fundamental as voting carry the risk of creating uncertainty and potentially alienating members, so status quo should be the default. Also, increasing the surface area of discussions could risk delaying other critical decisions. (edited)
- If the pDAO decides NOs <10% are indeed eligible for voting, this would take RPL(price) out of the calculations for vote power, and thus seems to significantly simplify the on-chain voting model proposed by Kane.
- Simplifies explaining who and how much RPL is allowed to vote.
- Provides a non-monetary (aka pure governance) use for staked RPL.
- Is a concession to overcollateralized NOs, just as <10% is a concession to undercollateralized NOs.
- If tokenomic changes happen (aka valdorff’s proposal or others), the current maximum voting power rules would seem antiquated anyhow since they wouldn’t be linked to rewards or withdrawable amount.
- Would moderately discourage sybiling
Anyhow, posting to see if there are any additional risks that I’m missing, and see if there is community appetite for this change.