This is the official discussion thread for Draft RPIP: Balance Submission Guardrail. Some prior discussion has taken place on Discord. This RPIP is targeted at the next smart contract upgrade (Saturn 1).
This idea originally came from my oDAO research that the GMC funded last year and wasn’t picked up for Houston. The goal is to limit oDAO power to an appropriate level and massively reduce the trust assumption for rETH holders.
I’d love to get useful feedback. No sentiment poll for now to allow for pDAO input first.
11 Likes
Makes sense to me. A relevant protection with very little tradeoff
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The one big downside here is having to admit knoshua did something useful.
This looks pretty good.
I like the dependency on pDAO (giving it ability to limit the rETH change parameter).
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I’ll repeat here what I said in the other guardrail proposal - With the combination of forced exits and delegate upgrades likely coming with Saturn, along with the existing penalty system - this guardrail is frankly a critical peice to keeping the trust assumptions placed in the ODAO contstrained. I heartily support this proposal and would like to see it in Saturn along with everything else.
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What is the rETH rate? It is rETH price, right? This term appears exactly once in a RPIP repo - in this draft.
rETH rate refers to the exchange rate of rETH. I’m open to changing the term to match existing RPIPs for consistency. Do you have such examples or is this mostly about there not being RPIPs about how the protocol works today?
I’m not that familiar with RPIPs to propose anything. Just pointing out that having clearly defined terms (maybe in footnotes, or as links, or otherwise) might improve comprehensibility of RPIPs for folks like me, so we don’t have to guess. I know it’s easier to say than do it, so let’s at least add a hint for ‘rETH rate’.
Yeah, having this might be great as well, but that’s another story.
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This is a good protection. Thank you for drafting.
Snapshot vote is live and I’ve voted in favor.
The rationale being that the situations in which this guardrail will be an impediment are more or less unthinkably rare, so having it as a protection seems sensible.
While I am in favor of this RPIP and think it should pass, I voted Against on the snapshot vote due to the presence of the vote text, which requests that this RPIP be included in the next major smart contract upgrade.
The RPIP outlines a good change and it should be implemented. However, RP desperately needs to push out Saturn 1 as fast as possible and every week matters. Since this RPIP only limits the power of a colluding oDAO (where this power has not been abused nor collusion occurred) I think that it should be put off until after Saturn 1 is implemented. The work for this RPIP as well as 57 and 58 all require smart contract changes which would delay Saturn 1.
If this RPIP were resubmitted to a snapshot vote where it did not stipulate that it be included before Saturn 1 is released I would vote in favor.