The Max Effective Stake for LEB8s vote has demonstrated that the RP community has the ability organize and reach a productive conclusion to a contentious issue.

Unfortunately, it also highlights the amount of damage that one evil whale can do if they game the quadratic voting power mechanism. Referencing @Valdorff’s comment shown below, a whale with power on the order of a few hundred votes could potentially turn that into a few thousand votes and single-handedly determine the winning outcome of RPIP-8.

For this reason, I propose that we immediately modify the voting power calculation to make voting power scale linearly with staked RPL. While this would give our benign whales more voting power relative to non-whales, it would also enable them to properly defend the community against an attacker without having to game the system themselves.

While linear voting power may not be an ideal solution for the long term, it can be modified later if/when we have a solution for sybil resistance, etc.

I hope that with enough support for this proposal, we can quickly get it to a snapshot vote and implemented.

I understand the reasoning, but will restate my opposition:

Linear makes the centralization of RPL painfully obvious. Maybe 5 individuals would control 30-40% of voting power? With a 15% quorum, a single whale could definitely decide a vote without other support. So it’s broken from the start, you don’t even need malice.

There are plenty of options between square root and linear. Pick any exponent between 0.5 and 1; a nice round number may not be best in this case.

There is a marked amount of Sybiling that would be needed before square root is worse than linear. 2x is not possible, and 10X is definitely impossible in comparison to linear

We just decided this issue a few months ago and we are in the middle of a contentious vote. i would say we should take a few weeks to heal.

A difficult to gauge downside of linear would be how it affects voting behaviors of smaller NOs. I certainly would be less likely to vote if I was considered 1/4000 of some other person, rather than 1/30. So it may trend towards oligarchy and exacerbate the centralizing effects.

Those are my two cents.

maths: exact numbers a bit old

i’ll use this example: Friendly whale Marceau.eth is hacked by unnamed actors and becomes diabolical sybil attacker with 175 minipools.
Under 1/2 square root, he has 237 of 27,803 or 0.85% of the vote
Under linear, he has 0.38M of 5.6M RPL or 6.7% of the vote
In order to get equal voting power (6.7% or 7.8x) under 1/2 square root, he needs 62 sybil accounts. in order to get twice as much voting power under 1/2 square root (13.4% of voting power), he’ll need about 250 sybil nodes (he only has 175). So maybe he ends up at 1.8x voting power if he Sybils all 175 nodes.
TLDR: a whale can easily increase his/her vote strength relative to other whales in square root; however, this is extremely unlikely to give that whale more power than linear voting because of the structural advantage to small holders.

I suppose this is what it boils down to–voting is simply broken. You can change strategies, but in every case there is a serious flaw.

It seems logical to prefer the following scenarios in order of decreasing preference:

Quadratic voting, sybil-proof

Quadratic voting, no apparent bad actors

Linear voting

Quadratic voting with bad actors

Currently, we don’t have a solution for 1, so we get 2 or 4, depending on our luck. Maybe that is a gamble worth taking until proven otherwise. Either way, the process is far from ideal.

Voting power = (Staked RPL)^0.8 is a little awkward to sell, but you may be pleasantly surprised as a compromise if you run the numbers. Also, i agree about our limited options for a somewhat broken system, but we only need some extremely rudimentary sybil resistance- like i think if you could keep our 175 minipool sybil to 40 nodes or less, they would have a smaller share than linear. Since almost all new nodes have 10-15% collateral, a sudden influx of dozens of 150% collateralized nodes should sound alarm bells on the social layer, if anyone takes the time to track such things.
And for now we have a rocket pool team to keep us out of trouble.

Reply to @NonFungibleYokem below

I do like the per capita minipool plus linear RPL option. It makes sybiling more expensive for sure, if harder to detect. And it rewards NOs for doing what we want them to do- run minipools- instead of just holding lots of RPL.
But…politically… it may not be the best time to introduce challenging ideas

It might make sense to split the voting weights into 2 tiers then - 1 tier being just a straight linear weigting based on the number of minipools a node has, and the 2nd being based on their effectively staked RPL. How to balance that might make the recent debate seem tame though.

I would like to suggest BrightID and ProofOfHumanity as potential solutions for 1. Maybe this would need another thread (or Discord chat). They seem promising to me as mitigations for the pseudospoofing attacks.

Threw out a quick thought in discord about having a weight per minipool.

I also quite like the in-between exponent @epineph has brought up a couple times.

I don’t have bandwidth at the moment, but it’d be great to see x-y scatters showing each individual’s voting power share (0-100%) under a couple of strategies:

quadratic (effective_rpl^0.5) - linear

quadratic vs erpl^0.8

quadratic vs 0.9*(share per erpl^0.8) + 0.1*(share per minipool count)

I think we know the dao likes the values behind quadratic, so we’re looking for something less gamable that looks “similar”. Could do least squares error, or just eyeball.

If anyone’s interested, the move is probably to grab data from rocketscan and then do excel/sheets/scripting stuff.

Followup is figuring out how much a theoretical whale share can increase via sybiling.

I just wanted to highlight this point, cuz I think it’s great and something I’ve missed at times.

Attacker power as a percentage should be what we protect against, not attacker power vs good whales. Good whales protect us, but so does the overall voting public.