Building on the momentum from our recent community call, I’m excited to bring the Rocket Pool Bridge Campaign to a vote. For those new to this initiative, I encourage you to review the discussion threads on the Rocket Pool Bridge Campaign and Owning rETH Contract Address on Ronin chain.
Unlocking New Opportunities for rETH and the DAO
Ronin is proposing to mint $3M USD in rETH and bridge it to their chain to establish a DeFi ecosystem. This partnership would integrate rETH as a foundational asset, driving demand and growth. Chainlink’s CCIP will serve as Ronin’s canonical bridge from Ethereum mainnet.
Diversifying the DAO’s Treasury
As the DAO explores ways to fund itself and diversify its treasury, this proposal presents a timely opportunity. By charging a small fee on rETH transactions to and from Ronin chain, we can create a new revenue stream and further strengthen the DAO’s financial foundation.
Decision Options for the DAO
We present three options for the DAO’s consideration:
Option 1: Contract Ownership with Fee: Rocket Pool retains ownership of the rETH contract address on Ronin chain and charges a fee for rETH bridged to and from Ronin chain.
Option 2: Limited Functionality with Fee: Rocket Pool restricts the mint and burn functions of the rETH contract address on Ronin chain and charges a fee on rETH bridged to and from Ronin chain.
Option 3: No Fee and No Contract Control: Rocket Pool relinquishes control of the rETH contract address and waives any fees on rETH bridged to and from Ronin chain.
These options offer varying degrees of control, revenue potential, and alignment with Ronin’s DeFi ecosystem. I look forward to the DAO’s discussion and decision on this proposal.
I will be voting for either #1 or #2. I am waiting to hear from the team on if they will reconsider owning the contract. If not, I might be in favor of burning it and relying on the goodwill of Chainlink.
I have been iffy on the fee, but I have come around. Especially as a sort of trial on Ronin, it’s worth normalizing bringing in other sources of income. The treasury is in dire shape. Even if this is just a few ETH, it’s worth trying.
Can you explain Option 2 a little more? What does it mean to “restrict the mint and burn functions”? Also it would help to understand what “Rocket Pool” refers to in your message (i.e. who are we talking about owning the contract potentially?)
Thank you for your comments @drdoofus. I agree with you, having more insight from Labs would help members of the DAO make a informed decision. If Labs chooses not to participate in owning the CA of rETH there are other options available as discussed in the Owning rETH Contract Address on Ronin chain thread.
GM @ramana thank you for your participation in the forum, I am happy to clarify option 2.
If the keys to the rETH contract address are burned, the Chainlink CCIP bridge will be the sole bridge capable of minting and burning rETH on Ronin. This means any other bridge interested in facilitating rETH bridging services would need to create a new, distinct version of rETH (similar to Arbitrum’s rETH and Hop Protocol’s hrETH). This would also require establishing a new liquidity pool (LP) on the destination chain.
As illustrated in the image shared by @Valdorff, this scenario is similar to Arbitrum, where a helper bridge is necessary due to the canonical bridge’s slow performance, particularly when bridging out of the chain. However, Chainlink’s CCIP bridge does not have this issue, as it is a fast bridge.
Regarding ownership of the contract address in Option 1, it could be Labs, if the DAO desires and Labs accepts, or it could be a DAO members. We acknowledge that there are legal concerns surrounding DAO member ownership, and AlphaGrowth is willing to introduce lawyers who can assist with creating a non-profit entity to handle OpSec for rETH bridging and other DAO needs.
Number 3 just means it is the option to not collect a fee. Under #2, we could still burn the contract and collect a fee. It’s basically, “do you think we should collect a fee? Then vote #1 or #2. If not vote #3”.
Ok. A fee can always be set to zero as long as we have governance, and we can always lock the contract. So going straight to 3 is to eliminate the cost/risk of governance.
It would of course be ideal to make these things onchain to remove centralisation. And CCIP does allow that I believe although I don’t know the mechanics, and no doubt it is work we may not have time for.
Frankly, I don’t consider contract ownership on the table right now if we wish to act expediently. Nobody has indicated a willingness to hold it and multiple potential holders have said no.
So — I’m purely voting between fee and no fee. As I’ve mentioned before, I don’t feel strongly. I decided to lean pro fee by a bit and selected that in the sentiment poll.
I’d like to provide some additional context from @langers in the Rocket Pool Bridge Campaign thread that I think is relevant to our discussion. Langers mentioned that while Rocket Pool Labs would prefer not to retain ownership of the contract, they are open to joining a group with community members to own the contract, which would alleviate most concerns. This approach is similar to the pDAO security council model.
Given our time-sensitive goal of getting the CCIP bridge up and running for Ronin to mint $3M in USD of rETH and launch their DeFi ecosystem, I propose a temporary solution: Rocket Pool Labs takes ownership of the rETH CA on Ronin until the DAO has a chance to discuss and establish an OpSec team to take over. This interim solution would allow us to move forward with the bridge while we work on a more permanent solution.
I started over on the other thread and am just catching up to this vote thread…
I’m not 100% certain on what you mean with Option 2. My interpretation is Option 2 would be “No Contract Control” (but CCIP still charges a fee)? It seems like we are not locked in to option 2 or 3, since CCIP can change the fee in the future… so from that perspective I’d prefer to do no fee at first, and then experiment with a more complex/tiered fee structure of some kind later. The main risk with option 2 and 3 is that we are at the whims of Chainlink, but I think the only way to avoid that is if we maintain ownership of the contract address? I don’t think there is a way for us to maintain ownership/control of the fee without maintaining ownership of the entire contract address? I think that is both too high of a risk (for rETH Ronin users and the actual people managing whatever multisig is setup), and will take too long to set something up imo…
I’m not sure how to vote for no fee at first, and then implement one later - but I think it aligns most closely with option 3 since that would be aligned in the short term, so that’s what I’ll vote for here.
“Contract Ownership with fee”, which is the current leader and might pull some folks from “limited functionality with fee” b/c it’s ‘close enough’
“Limited functionality with fee”, which isn’t too far behind and might pull folks from both other categories b/c it’s ‘close enough’.
I think I’d argue there’s promising sentiment for both. One option is to leave it to RPIP author’s discretion. An alternative we’ve done in the past is have 2 votes and take the one with most votes (assuming either one passes).
I think a lot of us are floating between the two with fees. Part of it is waiting to nail down ownership possibilities. The team has now pretty conclusively said they don’t want to do it alone. This means someone would have to make a push to ask who is willing to do it along with the team. Personally, I would not be willing to do it and I would caution people in the US to know what you’re getting into if you were to volunteer. Having said that, I’m not against other members being on such a multisig. So, if such a group can be assembled and they have thoughts about how much ownership they want, that would affect my vote.
To me there is a massive difference between option 1 and 2. Fee vs no fee (option 2 vs 3) seems trivial in comparison to maintain ownership of the contract or not. As you said maintaining ownership of the contract (option 1) has the complexity of first establishing who would actually do it and how would it work, and it also comes with a ton of risk that sways me against it even if we did have a structure in place to manage it.
Fee vs no fee can easily be adjusted in the future, but contract ownership vs no ownership is not something that can be easily changed
For me, it’s the opposite. I want the fee most of all. Treasury is hurting and I want to normalize the protocol looking for opportunities to bring in other funding. If this was Arbitrum or similar, maybe not. But for Ronin, it’s the perfect place to experiment, imo (especially since the fee will not amount to much).
The contract ownership is somewhat out of most of our hands. People will either want to on the multisig or won’t and they might have opinions on what they would want it to be associated with in their name. Or someone might not push the recruitment and it goes nowhere.
This is like going to Home Depot. You just need a couple small things: some brazing rods, two pieces of sheet metal, some flux (for brazing), some mapp gas and oxygen, some brazing goggles and a kitkat and suddenly it all adds up to $200. We bring in a little here and there and boom! Swimming in $$
Exactly. I think it is wise to sort this out long term but to ensure we can make the deal with Ronin we don’t really have a choice.
This is unfortunately the situation. If the DAO voted on taking ownership we would have to go through a recruitment process for the multisig, delaying the deal considerably.
The team will not take ownership temporarily because that has the potential to be permanent and opens us up to the concerns I have already raised (even temporarily).
@SSJ2_Spartan My preference would be to hold 2 votes, one for the contract address owner, and the other for the fee decision. They seem to be relatively independent questions, and the final combination could be the result of those two votes (eg, CCIP + yes fee). A simple example:
Vote #1
A. Move forward with CCIP as the sole owner
B. Do not move forward with CCIP as the sole owner
Vote #2
A. Flat fee: ($1 for Ethereum Mainnet → Ronin, $5 for Ronin → Ethereum Mainnet)
B. No fee
Voting for B on Vote 1 would just be a “no” for now until a multi-sig for the DAO can be established to delegate ownership to (and then hold another vote at that point). What I would want to avoid is delaying by trying to actually establish this hypothetical multi-sig just to provide a viable alternative in this specific vote, and then that option loses anyways and time was wasted.
