Background
After the Rocke Pool deposit pool limit was increased once, it is currently frequently at full capacity. In such instances, users are unable to mint rETH by staking ETH, they can only obtain ETH through swaps on a DEX. This has, to a certain extent, impacted the supply of rETH. If one desires to utilize the ETH in the deposit pool, one option is for users to perform unstake operations. However, this is undesirable as it not only fails to increase the rETH supply but also diminishes it. Another alternative is to boost the supply from node operators(NOs), which not only augments the rETH supply but also enhances ETH efficiency. RPIP-13 is precisely aimed at addressing how to increase the supply from node operators. Therefore, the ensuing discussion primarily focuses on strategies to amplify the supply from node operators and reduce the entry barrier for them.
Specification
Thoughts 1
Introducing a staking operator into the current NOs infrastructure, with the primary responsibility of providing 8ETH and RPL (2.4ETH). The staking operator has the flexibility to choose NOs to operate the validator. The fee for NOs is covered by the staking operator using RPL, and NOs can dynamically adjust its fee based on costs. The earnings for the validator continue to be distributed according to the existing model, involving the staking operator and staker, with NOs remaining uninvolved. Upon withdrawing earnings, the staking operator is required to utilize RPL to pay the fee to NOs.
In order to better assist staking operators in selecting suitable NOs, it is necessary to list the performance and fees of NOs. This way, staking operators can make more informed decisions by balancing performance and costs when choosing an operator.
Ideally, staking operators should be able to dynamically switch operators to ensure optimal prices and performance. However, due to issues with the validator key, this may not be achievable in the current context. If we aim to address the problem of NOs holding validator keys, it might be necessary to introduce a solution similar to DVT.
--------------------------------------
deposit pool (24ETH) |
-------------------------------------- ------> Deposit Contract
staking operator (8ETH + RPL) |
--------------------------------------
^ |
| | select node operator
rewards | |
| | pay fee (RPL)
| v
---------------------------------------
node operator1 | node operator2 | ... | -------> Validator
---------------------------------------
Thoughts 2
To operate as a node operator, one needs to stake a certain amount of RPL. When a node operator is not selected as a validator, running a node allows participation in RPL staking to earn rewards. Additionally, RPL holders can delegate their RPL to a node operator to earn staking rewards.
Staking operators only need 8 ETH without the need for additional RPL to choose a node operator for operation. Staking operators still need to provide RPL to the node operator to pay fees. The choice of operator is based on the fee and performance of the node operator. Validator earnings are distributed between the staking operator and the staker.
Due to the RPL staking by the node operator, which serves as a constraint for slashing and ensures the proper operation of the node, there is less need for staking operators to switch frequently.
-------------------------------------------------
deposit pool (24ETH) |
------------------------------------------------ ------> Deposit Contract
staking operator (8ETH) |
------------------------------------------------
^ |
| | select node operator
rewards | |
| | pay fee (RPL)
| v
--------------------------------------------------
node operator1 (RPL) | node operator2 (RPL) | ... | -------> Validator
--------------------------------------------------
^
| delegate
|
--------------------------------------------------
RPL holder |
--------------------------------------------------
Summary
The aforementioned thoughts consider separating the roles of the node operator and capital provider, introducing the role of a staking operator to operate and manage minipools. The primary aim is to enhance the supply from node operators, thereby increasing the overall supply of rETH.
Additionally, the evaluation of the performance of node operators mentioned in the thoughts can be integrated with existing discussions. This can be achieved through market and economic mechanisms to improve the overall node performance.
Finally, your feedback is welcome. If there are feasible suggestions, I will continue to refine and submit a pull request on GitHub.